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CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING
Appellant Board of Education of the Jordan School District ("Jordan School
District") and Appellee Sandy City Corporation ("Sandy City" or "City") have previously
consented to the appearance of the Utah School Boards Association as amicus curiae as
required by Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A Stipulation Consenting
to the Filing of Amicus Briefs by parties in support of the Jordan School District was
previously filed with the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction for appellate review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
The Utah School Boards Association hereby adopts and incorporates the
Statement of Issues Presented for Appeal set forth in the Brief of Appellant Jordan
School District. In addition, the Utah School Boards Association believes that in ruling
on this appeal the Court can and should consider the practical effect of the storm drain
charges, whether those charges are characterized as fees or assessments or otherwise, to
determine if the charges are in reality an improper tax of one governmental entity upon
another.
CONTROLLING STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Section 10-9-106, Utah Code Annotated, provides in relevant part:
(2) A school district is subject to a municipality's land use
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regulations under this chapter, except that a municipality may
not:
* * *

(c) require a district to pay fees not authorized by this
section;
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315 provides in relevant part:
. . . [A] municipality may not levy an assessment against property owned by
the federal government, the state of Utah, any county, school district,
municipality or other political subdivision of the state of Utah or by any
department or division of any such public agency even though such
property is benefited by improvements made, but each such public agency
is authorized to contract with the municipality for the making of such
improvement and for the payment of the cost thereof to the municipality.
Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality from imposing or a
public agency from paying reasonable charges for any services or materials
actually rendered or supplied by the municipality to the public agency,
including, by way of example and not in limitation, charges for water,
lighting, or sewer services.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

Jordan School District has challenged the authority of Appellee, Sandy City
Corporation ("Sandy City" or "City"), a municipality located within Salt Lake County, to
assess a monthly "storm sewer drainage fee" (the "storm drain charge") to pay for the
costs of operating, improving and maintaining the storm sewer drain system of Sandy
City.
This appeal arises directly from the Order of the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County by Judge Roger A. Livingston, granting Partial Summary
Judgment to Sandy City and an Order entered 1 November 2001 Dismissing Remaining
2

Claims or Theories Without Prejudice signed by Judge Livingston on 17 December 2001
and filed with the lower court on 18 December 2001.
B.

Nature of Utah School Boards Association's Interest in this Appeal

The Utah School Boards Association ("the Association") is established pursuant
to authority of Utah Code Annotated § 53A-5-2 and operates as an agent and
representative of 40 school districts throughout the state. Each of these school districts
operates schools which are located in municipalities and therefore may be subjected to
storm drain ordinances similar to the ordinance at issue in the instant case. The Utah
School Boards Association as amicus curiae will attempt to represent to the Court the
perspective and interests of the range of school districts that are members of the
association. The Association's primary concern is that the charges made pursuant to the
storm drain ordinance in question here, however those charges may be labeled or
characterized, are in actual effect a tax being imposed by one governmental entity upon
another. The Association therefore desires that the Court provide guidance regarding the
permissible scope of charges for services as opposed to monetary exactions for other
purposes.
C.

Statement of Facts

The Utah School Boards Association adopts the statement set forth in the
"Statement of Facts" of the Brief of Appellant Jordan School District.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The storm drain charge imposed by Sandy City is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. §
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10-9-106 because it directly affects the management and development of land by
impacting issues concerning both facility construction and landscaping design.
In addition, and more importantly, the storm drain charge is in actuality a tax
which is being imposed by one governmental entity, the City, upon another, the Jordan
School District. Whether or not the technicalities of terminology apply, the practical
effect of the storm drain charge is to compel Jordan School District to contribute its
taxpayer-derived funds to the City's project to develop new and expanded storm drain
facilities. The charges are in effect the same as an assessment on school property which
is prohibited by § 17A-3-315. Sandy City should be barred from compelling this
redistribution of taxpayer funds from Jordan School District to itself notwithstanding its
effort to evade limitations on intergovernmental taxation by the terminology it uses in its
storm drain ordinance. Ruling otherwise would open the door to municipalities
effectively taxing school districts throughout the state for any capital improvement
project which can be tied to an activity which also ostensibly involves a service when
taxation is specifically prohibited by statute.
In addition, the amount of the charges at issue raises serious questions regarding
the reasonableness of those charges, and the Association believes that a full disposition
of the validity of the charges should also involve an appropriately supported examination
of the reasonableness of the charges. In the event that the Court sustains the ordinance in
question, the Association recommends that the Court remand for further factual
proceedings regarding the reasonableness of the charges.
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ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-106 and Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315, among other
statutes, implement the general prohibition and policy against the redistribution of public
funds from one tax-supported entity to another absent the specific authority of limited
exceptions. The structure and effect of the Sandy City ordinance indicates that the City
in this ordinance has attempted to sidestep this prohibition and essentially tax Jordan
School District under the guise of charging "for services." By characterizing the
assessments as charges for services, the City is doing "indirectly what it cannot do
directly." State ex rel Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. McGonagle, 11 P. 401,
402 (Utah 1910). The storm drain charge is in reality an assessment prohibited by Utah
Code Ann. § 17A-3-315 rather than a permissible charge for services under that statute.
The District Court's sustaining of the ordinance was therefore in error and its decision
should be reversed.
I.

THE STORM DRAINAGE UTILITY FEE IS PROHIBITED AS AN
UNAUTHORIZED FEE BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-106(2)(C).

The Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §
10-9-106(2)(c), prohibits the collection of Sandy City's storm drain charge because those
charges effectively constitute a fee imposed based on school district decisions on how to
use its land. Section 10-9-106(2)(c) provides in part:
A school district is subject to a municipality's land use regulations under this
chapter, except that a municipality may not: . . . require a district to pay fees not
authorized in this section.
Significantly, section 10-9-106(2)(a) prohibits a municipality from "imposing]
5

requirements for landscaping, fencing, aesthetic considerations, construction methods or
materials, building codes, building use for educational purposes, or the placement or use
of temporary classroom facilities on school property/' The utility fee being charged by
Sandy City directly affects and is directly based upon school property use, and therefore
effectively imposes requirements regarding landscaping, construction methods, and the
placement of school facilities. Because the charges are based on property area and area
of impervious surface, the charges directly impact Jordan School District's land use
decisions concerning various matters including facility construction (for example,
whether to build schools with multiple stories to reduce the building "footprint" and
thereby the impervious surface area) and landscaping design questions such as whether
play areas are grass or asphalt, and whether to include rainwater catch basins separately
or to design play areas and athletic fields also to serve this purpose.
Furthermore, aside from the specific considerations mentioned in section 10-9106(2)(a), section 10-9-106(2)(c) has been violated because of the simple fact that Sandy
City seeks to charge Jordan School District based on the manner in which it is using its
land. That is a fee in connection with land use and is prohibited by this statute, and
interferes with Jordan School District in fulfilling its duty to provide its students,
teachers and other school occupants with "safety, health, and comfort." See Utah Code
Ann. § 53A-20-103(l)(b).
Sandy City argues that section 10-9-106 does not apply because the City is merely
imposing a fee for services rendered, which is expressly permitted by Utah Code Ann. §

6

17A-3-315, and therefore this more specific statute regarding charges for services or
materials actually rendered or supplied should govern. The City urges this Court to
"limit the applicability of §10-9-106(2)(c) to fees under the Municipal Land Use and
Development Act." (Brief of Sandy City p. 10.) This narrow view of section 10-9-106
ignores the real impact on land use which the ordinance in question has and also ignores
significant differences between the storm water drainage charge and charges for utility
services supplying electricity or water or taking and disposing sewage produced by an
entity. Unlike those utility services, the storm water charges are not based on the actual
amount of power or water provided or the actual amount of sewage treated, or even on
the actual amount of pollution which is added by Jordan School District's properties, but
are instead based upon the manner in which the district is using its property. Therefore,
the land-use provisions included in section 10-9-106 are in fact more specific to this case
than the portions of section 17A-3-315 relating to charges for services, and the taxing
prohibition in the land use statute should control.
II.

THE STORM DRAINAGE UTILITY FEE IS PROHIBITED AS AN
UNLAWFUL ASSESSMENT AGAINST JORDAN SCHOOL
DISTRICT IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-315.

Apart from the land-use considerations, the Sandy City ordinance cannot be
applied to Jordan School District because it establishes an assessment prohibited by Utah
Code Ann. § 17A-3-315. Under the plain language of the Sandy City storm drain
ordinance, the great majority of the charges made in connection for the storm drain are
not for the services of operating and maintaining of the system but rather are for capital
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improvements. The ordinance provides for a "service fee credit" which can be obtained
by non-residential parcels by instituting on-site mitigation measures. See Sandy City
Municipal Code § 17-2-6(c)(4), R. 46-47. This credit is calculated using a formula
which indicates that 70% of the total storm drain charges represent costs for the storm
drain utility's "capital improvement program." See id. The remaining 30% represent the
utility's "fixed operation and maintenance costs/' or the actual handling of water and
upkeep of the system.1 Thus, the storm drain fee is imposed primarily to fund the
construction of new facilities for handling storm water, and not for services of handling
that storm water.
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315 provides in relevant part 2 :
. . . [A] municipality may not levy an assessment against property owned by the
federal government, the state of Utah, any county, school district, municipality or
other political subdivision of the state of Utah or by any department or division of
any such public agency even though such property is benefitted by improvements
made, but each such public agency is authorized to contract with the municipality
for the making of such improvement and for the payment of the cost thereof to the
municipality. Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality from imposing
or a public agency from paying reasonable charges for any services or materials
actually rendered or supplied by the municipality to the public agency, including,

*It is significant to note that the structure of the formula is such that even if the
non-residential property has on-site retention facilities such that there will be no runoff
from the property, the property will still be charged 30% of the regular storm drain fee:
In other words, the property will be charged for services even when no services are
actually being provided.
2

The remainder of the statute permits assessments in the narrow factual context
where the public entity acquires property after that property was already subject to an
assessment. See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315(2). That provision is not relevant or
material to this case.
8

by way of example and not in limitation, charges for water, lighting, or sewer
services.
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315(l) (emphasis added).
Despite the City's labeling the storm drain fee a "charge for services," the fee in
reality and in its effect constitutes an assessment and is therefore prohibited under section
17A-3-315. The fee should be considered an assessment because it is (1) imposed on
property for the purpose of building capital improvements benefitting the property, and
(2) it is involuntarily imposed on a general basis. Furthermore, Sandy City's exemption
of state and county property constitutes a tacit acknowledgment that the fee constitutes an
assessment or tax.
A)

Assessments exist when the funds are used to pay "all or a portion of
the costs of making improvements"

An assessment is defined as "a special tax levied against property within a special
improvement district to pay all or a portion of the costs of making improvements in the
district." § 17A-3-303(1) (emphasis added). In describing assessments for purposes of a
statute exempting school districts from assessments, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
an assessment "is levied under the taxing power and is imposed on property within a
limited area for an improvement to enhance all property within that area." Murray City
v. Board of Ed. of Murray City School District, 396 P.2d 628, 630 (Utah 1964). "On the
other hand, the cost of a service is determined by the benefits conferred upon the
occupants of the land rather than increase in value to the land itself." Id. In upholding
the monthly sewer charge at issue in Murray City, the Court observed that the city had
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the authority to "impose charges for sewer treatment and disposal as a sewer district." Id.
at 632. Significantly, however, the Court also distinguished between improvements such
as paving a street or laying sewer pipe as proper bases for assessment, whereas
transitory benefits such as providing water to the property or removing and treating
sewage were not properly benefits to the land (and thus resulted in charges for services).
See id. at 631.
Thus, an assessment is a charge for permanent, capital improvements which are of
a benefit to an area of land rather than a charge for ongoing services being provided to
the occupants of the land. The storm drain charges are in essence charges made based on
property use, for the purpose of building capital improvements to benefit property by
handing run-off from impervious surfaces. Therefore, the charges are in spirit and effect,
if not in name, assessments which are prohibited. The City's own ordinance expressly
acknowledges that the charges are primarily made for purposes of capital improvements
to the storm drain system rather than for actual services being provided over a period of
time. Unlike the charges in the Murray City case, these charges are not primarily for
operation and maintenance of the improvement. As a charge for capital improvements to
benefit land, the storm drain charges are assessments and therefore, pursuant to section
17A-3-315, cannot be assessed to Jordan School District.
In considering a challenge raised by Granite School District to a one-time charge
impact fee to be applied to similar storm-drain purposes, this Court in Salt Lake County
v. Board of Education of the Granite School District, 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991),
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observed, "We agree with Granite that its exemption from payment of local assessments
should not be denied it by the simple expedient of calling a local assessment by another
name." In that opinion, which considered an impact fee, the Court felt bound by the
Legislature's enactments expressly authorizing impact fees to be charged to school
districts in appropriate circumstances. The Association acknowledges that properly
supported impact fees, which are in the nature of one-time charges imposed as a precondition to new building development, may be validly imposed against school districts
in appropriate circumstances. However, the ordinance in question is not based on new
development. The Legislature has not expressed any policy that municipalities may
charge school districts with assessments for capital improvements by characterizing such
charges as for "services."
B)

Assessments exist when fees are involuntarily and imposed upon
benefitting property owners

The storm drain fees are also an assessment because they are imposed
involuntarily on landowners whose property is claimed to directly or indirectly benefit
from the improvement. In Pappas v. Richfield City, 962 P.2d 63, 66 (Utah 1998), this
Court considered the definition of the term "assessment" and explained:
The term "assessment" is a term of art and is expressly defined in the Utah
Municipal Improvement Act as "a special tax levied against property within a
special improvement district to pay all or a portion of the costs of making
improvements in the district." Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-303(l)(a) (emphasis
added). This definition makes clear that an assessment is a tax, and it is
commonly understood that the "[e]ssential characteristics of a tax are that it is not
a voluntary payment or donation, but an enforced contribution, exacted pursuant
to legislative authority." (citation omitted).
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Id. (emphasis in original). In Pappas, the school district was exempt from assessment
and would have had no obligation to pay the assessment but for the district's voluntary
(contractual) agreement to do so. See id. at 64, 66. Here, Jordan School District has not
voluntarily undertaken to pay the storm drain fees, which the City seeks to impose on the
district. The District is by ordinance compelled to pay, even if it retains all storm water
on its property. These involuntary charges for capital improvements are properly
considered assessments, and Jordan School District should be exempt.
The charges are also imposed only on properties which are claimed to benefit
directly or indirectly from the storm drain system. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-316(l)
provides:
Assessments shall be levied on all blocks, lots, parts of blocks and lots, tracts, or
parcels of property bounding, abutting upon, or adjacent to, the improvements or
that may be affected or specially benefited by the improvements to the extent of
the benefits to the property by reason of the improvements. These benefits may be
indirect and need not actually increase the fair market value of the property.
The claimed need for the storm drain improvements is the increased run-off
caused by impervious surfaces on improved property. As stated in the ordinance, the
storm drain charges are "impose[d] . . . on each parcel of real property." Sandy City
Municipal Code § 17-2-6(a), R. 45. The ordinance expressly characterizes the charges
as being "assessed on each parcel of real property." Sandy City Municipal Code § 17-26(c), R. 46 (emphasis added). The charge is imposed only on those properties which are
improved; thus, only properties claimed to be specially benefitted by the capital
improvements are charged. This further demonstrates the nature of the charges as an
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assessment which Utah law plainly prohibits the City from imposing on school districts.
C)

Sandy City's exemption of certain properties is a tacit admission that
the charges constitute an assessment.

Apart from the ordinance language referring to the charges as assessments against
real property, there are other indications in the ordinance that the charges are in the
nature of impermissible assessments. By exempting certain governmental property
owners, the storm drain ordinance tacitly admits that the storm drain charges are in fact
an invalid assessment. The ordinance provides:
The City will by resolution of the City Council impose storm sewer drainage fee
rates and charges on each parcel of real property within the City except
governmentally-owned streets and storm water facilities operated and maintained
by, or for, the County or the State of Utah.
Sandy City Municipal Code § 17-2-6(c)(4), R. 46-47 (emphasis added). It seems obvious
that when writing the ordinance, the Sandy City Council recognized that it could only
assess property not owned or operated by a public agency.3 The storm drain charges
have been justified by the City and amicus Orem City on the ground that the City is
providing services in treating polluted runoff water. However, that rationalization is
contradicted by the storm water ordinance's exemption of public streets from its scope:
logic suggests that streets, which would be a major (if not the primary) source of
pollution in run-off require more of these services than most other property, yet that
property is not being charged for those services. The apparent justification for the

3

While the ordinance does seem to suggest that Sandy City property is also to be
assessed, this would likely be a matter of bookkeeping rather than actual payments, given
that it is the City which is collecting the charges.
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differential treatment is that the streets are governmentally owned, which is consistent
with the prohibition in Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315 against assessing property of other
governmental entities. See Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315(l) ("municipality may not levy
an assessment against property owned by the federal government, the state of Utah, any
county, school district, municipality or other political subdivision of the state of Utah").
Because that prohibition includes school districts along with the State and county, the
exemption for governmentally owned streets should also be applied to other
governmentally owned property such as school district property. That raises the
significant question of whether property of other governmental entities including the
State of Utah and Salt Lake County (courthouses, DMV facilities, administrative offices,
and so forth) are in fact being assessed the storm water fees on the same basis as Jordan
School District.
The exception for governmentally owned streets is inconsistent with the theory
that a service is being provided, but it is consistent with the understanding that the storm
drain charges are in fact an assessment which may not be imposed on the property of
other governmental entities. An assessment which may not be imposed against other
governmental entities also may not be imposed against Jordan School District.
As outlined above, there are several notable ways in which the storm drainage
charges partake of the nature of an assessment which is prohibited by state statute.
However, whether or not the storm drain charges operate exactly like an "assessment" in
the technical sense of the term, in that they become a lien against the property of Jordan
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School District, it is apparent that the real effect is that of an assessment-like tax. This is
a monetary exaction imposed based on property ownership, on the grounds that the
exaction is appropriate because the property is to be benefitted by a public improvement
which has not been put into place. It is plainly not a charge for services of treating runoff water and operating and maintaining an existing system, because even entities which
retain all of their run-off (thereby not making any use of the supposed services) are
nevertheless charged under the ordinance.
III.

IF THE STORM DRAINAGE UTILITY CHARGES ARE NOT
BEING MADE TO OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, THEN
THE CHARGES MAY BE INVALID REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER THEY ARE A PROHIBITED ASSESSMENT.

The record does not disclose whether the storm drain charges are made against
other property of other governmental entities within Sandy City apart from the
governmentally owned streets and water treatment facilities. If such charges are not
imposed, then there are serious questions regarding the validity of the charges being
imposed on Jordan School District. It would appear to be arbitrary and capricious or an
abuse of discretion for Sandy City to choose to charge the property of some governmental
entities while not charging property of other governmental entities. Any services
provided to Jordan School District by virtue of the district owning developed property are
identical to the services provided to other governmental entities which also own
governmental property. The express exemption for certain governmental property raises
the question of whether other governmental property not expressly exempted is being
assessed the storm drain charges. It would therefore be appropriate to remand to
15

determine whether in fact the storm drain charges are uniformly applied to property of all
governmental entities.
IV.

EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THE STORM
DRAIN CHARGES ARE PERMISSIBLE "CHARGES FOR
SERVICES," THERE IS SERIOUS QUESTION WHETHER THE
CHARGES ARE REASONABLE.

Even assuming that this Court were to determine that the storm drain charges are
actually charges for services rather than assessments for capital improvements, this
amicus believes that serious questions about the reasonableness of the charges warrants
remanding this matter for further proceedings. Sandy City in its brief cites and relies on
that portion of Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315 which provides:
. . . Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality from imposing or a public
agency from paying reasonable charges for any services or materials actually
rendered or supplied by the municipality to the public agency, including, by way
of example and not in limitation, charges for water, lighting, or sewer service.
Assuming, arguendo, that the utility fee imposed is a charge for services which would
normally be permitted under § 17A-3-315, there are serious questions whether the
charges are reasonable fees based on services or materials actually provided. While there
is little information in the record regarding the total amount of revenue generated by
Sandy City's storm drain fees, the little information that there is suggests that it is highly
disproportionate to the actual services being provided. The record does contain a bill for
Jordan High School for one month. (R. 7.) The portion of that bill related to storm drain
charges is $828.54. That translates to approximately $10,000 per year from one school.
In addition to this high school, the Jordan School District operates several middle schools
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and numerous elementary schools within the boundaries of Sandy City. (Record 16-18.)
The Orem City amicus brief indicates that school district property in Orem accounts for
about 5% of all of the property which it subjects to storm drain charges. If Jordan School
District property forms a similar proportion of the Sandy City charged property, the total
amount of revenue is likely quite large. This large amount of money, in conjunction with
the Sandy City ordinance's explicit acknowledgment that 70% of the fees are not applied
to maintenance and operation, strongly suggests that the charges are not a reasonable
charge for services. Given that the record is not adequate to fully address this issue, in
the event that this Court sustains the decision below regarding the general question of
whether the charges may be imposed, it would be appropriate to remand for further
proceedings regarding reasonableness of the charges.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Utah School Boards Association respectfully urges
this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court and to provide guidance that
municipalities may not tax school district property for public improvements merely by
characterizing those taxes as charges for services. Should the Court sustain the
ordinance in question with regard to the general authority of the City to impose a storm
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drain fee, the Association asks that the Court remand for further proceedings regarding
the reasonableness of the charges imposed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8 TH day of October. 2002.

BURBIDGE & WHITE, LLC

Brinton R. Burbidge
Thomas C. Anderson
Attorneys for Amicus Utah
School Boards Association
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